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Environmental Law in the United States
and the European Community: Spillovers,
Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions
Richard B. Stewartt
Is the European Community's environmental policy marching
forward, hand-in-hand with economic and political integration, to
secure a high level of environmental protection throughout the Eu-
ropean Union? The achievements of the European Community's
successive environmental programs, the explicit recognition of en-
vironmental objectives in the Single European Act ("SEA"), and
the Maastricht initiatives all point to an affirmative answer. There
are good reasons to suppose that progressive European Community
("Community" or "EC") environmental policy could help promote
economic and political integration and that such integration could,
in turn, favor progressive environmental policies.
Community regulation of products promotes environmental,
health, and safety objectives and, at the same time, furthers the
internal market. Common controls on pollution and waste disposal
prevent potentially self-defeating competition among Member
States in regulatory laxity. Joint efforts to further the shared inter-
est in environmental protection promote political and social
solidarity.
Nevertheless, optimism must be tempered by caution. The
completion of an internal market will put serious strains on Com-
munity environmental policy. Economic growth will cause an in-
crease in polluting activities unless additional preventive measures
are taken. Open frontiers will erode the Member States' ability to
control toxic wastes. Cooperation among the Member States to
protect the environment will continue to be compromised by wide
differences in the importance attached to that goal, by administra-
tive capabilities, and by economic rivalry between Member States.
The completion of the internal market will intensify that rivalry.
Community institutions are at present far too weak to ensure effec-
tive implementation and enforcement of a common environmental
t Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Counsel, Sidley & Austin. B.A.,
Yale University, 1961; M.A., Oxford University, 1963; LL.B, Harvard University, 1966.
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policy throughout the Community. Efforts to strengthen central in-
stitutions will be resisted and may impede agreement on new Com-
munity legislation. Popular opposition to Maastricht in many
Member States, driven by concerns over excessive centralization
and loss of national sovereignty to Brussels "Eurocrats," has
blunted enthusiasm for strong Community initiatives. An effective,
comprehensive, Community-wide environmental policy is by no
means assured.
In the United States, environmental policy has developed in
an historical and institutional context very different than that in
Europe. In the United States, concern with environmental issues
arose long after far-reaching economic, political, and social integra-
tion had occurred. The United States is a mature federal system
with strong central institutions that possess and exercise direct au-
thority to implement and enforce federal environmental laws and
regulations. While state and regional interests remain important
actors in environmental politics, most issues are dominated by na-
tionally organized industrial and environmental interests who are
not committed to state autonomy for its own sake.
Despite the Single European Act and the additional steps to-
ward economic and political integration launched in Maastricht,
the Community remains a supranational organization. The
dreaded "F" word has still not been admitted to its lexicon.1
Among other matters, the Community still lacks direct implemen-
tation and enforcement powers. Further, the authority of the only
directly elected Community institution-the European Parlia-
ment-is still significantly less than that of the Council, which is
the voice of the Member States. Europe-wide interest groups in
general, and environmental groups in particular, are weaker than
their counterparts in the United States. The Member States, many
of whom are concerned with preserving substantial policy indepen-
dence, play a relatively larger role. Another complicating factor is
the possibility of further expansion in the membership of the Com-
munity. If nations of Central and Eastern Europe become associ-
ated with the Community, the devastated condition of their envi-
ronment and industrial infrastructure will pose an acute challenge
for Community environmental policy.
Because of these historical and institutional differences, the
evolutionary path of environmental policy is far more indetermi-
nate in the Community than in the United States. In Europe, eco-
The dreaded "F" word is, of course, "federal."
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nomic and political integration is ongoing but incomplete, not only
shaping but also shaped by the development of environmental pol-
icy. Nonetheless, there are important functional similarities in the
types of environmental problems presented in a federal system
such as the United States and in supranational systems such as the
Community. Most important are the different types of
spillovers-pollution, product, competitive, and preservation-that
occur among Member States. The welfare losses caused by these
spillovers often make cooperative measures dealing with these
spillovers mutually advantageous. Moreover, there is a common ar-
ray of institutional tools-such as regulation, liability rules, subsi-
dies, and pollution charges-available to deal with different types
of spillovers. There is also a similar array of potential legal and
administrative means for implementing and enforcing environmen-
tal protection measures. These common elements provide a foun-
dation for comparative analysis.
The United States experience also provides warnings for the
Community about the dangers of an over-centralized command
style of environmental policy. In the United States, such an ap-
proach has led to an excessively clumsy, costly, and legalistic sys-
tem of regulation that has impeded achievement of environmental
goals. These dangers are at present less evident in the Community,
in part because enforcement is weaker. Litigation is also far less
extensive in the Community than in the United States. But even
without high levels of litigation, the Community's reliance on cen-
tralized command and control directives to achieve environmental,
public health, and safety objectives is beginning to display some of
the same dysfunctions it has in the United States: centralized in-
formation-processing overload, excessive rigidity and cost in regu-
latory measures, a "democracy deficit" resulting from an opaque,
remote political/bureaucratic decisionmaking process, and the
growth of a new class of regulatory lawyers and lobbyists seeking
to influence that process to the economic advantage of their cli-
ents. Concerns in the Member States over these developments may
well play a role in the popular unease over the Maastricht Treaty
that is now evident.2
" See Alison Smith, The Liberal Democrats at Harrogate: The Danish Minister Hopes
for a French Yes, Financial Times 12 (Sept 15, 1992), reporting the remarks of Mr. Otte
Ellemann-Jensen, the Danish Foreign Minister. Mr. Ellemann-Jensen argued that the Com-
munity must become more accountable and less bureaucratic by developing subsidiarity as a
counter to centralizing tendencies. "Unless the Community is able to convince the European
populations that we mean what we say when we talk about subsidiarity, the European inte-
gration will be brought to an abrupt halt," he warned. Id.
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Community environmental legislation will not ensure strong
environmental protection or promote political integration unless it
is effectively enforced. But Community legislation must simultane-
ously provide the flexibility needed to accommodate different na-
tional and regional situations and concerns. Today, such flexibility
is largely secured by differences in the implementation and en-
forcement of Community environmental legislation in the Member
States. States with a strong commitment to given Community
measures tend to implement them effectively. Compliance in other
states is more of a paper exercise.
Obviously such "implementation gaps" are a poor way to
achieve regulatory flexibility. Reliance on ever-more-detailed cen-
tral regulations, directives, and decisions to close these implemen-
tation gaps may give an appearance of progress but ultimately
prove self-defeating. This strategy of techno-bureaucratic central
planning threatens to exacerbate the Community's democracy defi-
cit and undermine the perceived legitimacy of Community mea-
sures in the Member States. The United States experience suggests
two antidotes. The first antidote is to encourage an expanded role
for environmental and citizen groups at the Member State level by
affording them new enforcement and other remedies through Com-
munity law. Second, the EC should make greater use of economic
incentives to achieve environmental objectives.
I. DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN A MULTIJURISDIC-
TIONAL SYSTEM
The evolution of environmental policy in a federal or suprana-
tional polity is driven by the interplay among three factors: the
character of different environmental spillovers, the interests of the
constituent member states and cross-cutting interest groups, and
legal and political institutions.
A. Spillovers
The raison d'etre of a federal or supranational polity is to reap
benefits from cooperation. Decentralized decisionmaking by inde-
pendent states often fails to secure citizens' welfare because of var-
ious kinds of inter-state externalities or spillovers. Because of these
externalities, a system of independent states may "fail" for reasons
similar to why markets composed of independent economic actors
sometimes "fail." In both situations, collective action may reduce
the costs associated with these spillovers and prove mutually bene-
ficial. On the other hand, rivalry among individuals or states for
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economic advantage may prevent or undermine such cooperation.
There are several distinct types of environmental spill-
overs. The response of a federal or supranational polity to such
spillovers depends on the type of spillover involved and how it af-
fects incentives for rivalry and cooperation.'
Product spillovers are created by the free movement of goods
in a common market. Some states may seek to exclude products
from other states on the ground that they are environmentally de-
ficient, creating trade barriers. In addition, imposition of different
product regulations by states may prevent realization of scale
economies in manufacturing and marketing. Both effects under-
mine the objectives of a common market and impair economic
integration.
Pollution spillovers occur when pollutants or wastes generated
by industry, transport, or agriculture cross state boundaries. The
polluter state will have little or no incentive to take the interests of
the receiving state into account in deciding on the extent of envi-
ronmentally protective measures. As a result, excessive pollution or
waste will be generated.
Competitive spillovers are created by the effects of state envi-
ronmental regulatory decisions on competition and industrial loca-
tion. A state will be reluctant to impose strict controls on its indus-
try for fear that its industry will suffer a competitive disadvantage
relative to industry in other states. The mobility of capital and
other production factors within the common market may en-
courage states to adopt lax environmental controls in order to at-
tract industrial development. These pressures will be intensified by
uncertainty regarding the strategic responses of other states. As a
result, all states may suffer from greater pollution than would oc-
cur if there were no economic spillovers.
A final category consists of preservation spillovers. An espe-
cially scenic or ecologically significant natural resource located in
one state will be admired by citizens in other states, who will wish
to visit it or simply know that it is being preserved. The state in
which the resource is located, however, is likely to disregard out-of-
I For more extensive discussion of these issues, see Eckard Rehbinder and Richard B.
Stewart, Integration Through Law, Environmental Protection Policy ch 1 (DeGuyter,
1985); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J 1196 (1977).
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state interests, and fail adequately to protect and preserve the
resource.
4
Many environmental problems involve more than one type of
spillover. Consider, for example, the contribution of emissions from
automobiles produced by different manufacturers in western Eu-
rope to transboundary air pollution that injures ancient German
forests. Further, spillovers may be global as well as regional. A re-
gional or other group of nations with similar global environmental
interests can enhance its influence by adopting common environ-
mental measures. This is an additional incentive for developing
common policies.
B. Interests
Adoption of common or cooperative measures to deal with
these types of spillovers can advance mutual welfare. Such mea-
sures, however, involve not only benefits but also burdens. More-
over, both the benefits and the burdens of cooperation are almost
always distributed unequally. The situation is further complicated
by the fact that different states will have different preferences for
environmental quality versus economic growth, depending on their
culture, history, and wealth. Each state will attempt to secure the
adoption of common measures that will maximize the benefits that
it enjoys and minimize the burdens.' But this objective typically
entails lower benefits and higher burdens for other states. Rivalry
for relative advantage often prevents or delays the adoption of
common measures, as illustrated by the experience in the United
States with respect to radioactive waste disposal, solid and hazard-
ous waste disposal, and acid deposition.'
The situation is further complicated by the role played by
cross-cutting political interests, such as industry trade associations
and environmental groups. Yet another factor is the presence of
scale economies and diseconomies in decisionmaking and adminis-
4 Insofar as citizens of other states come to view and enjoy the resource, the state in
which it is located may be able to charge them an entrance fee. This technique, however,
may be infeasible for some resources, such as magnificent scenic vistas. Moreover, there is
no feasible way to charge citizens of other states for the non-use benefits (existence and
option values) which they enjoy by knowing that a treasured resource elsewhere is
preserved.
' See Owen Lomas, Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European
Community, 33 McGill L J 506 (1988).
6 For example, federal legislation addressing acid deposition was stymied for ten years
by regional rivalries before Congress finally addressed the problem in Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. Clean Air Act, §§ 401-416, 42 USC §§ 7651-7651o.
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tration. It may, for example, be cheaper to do research and analy-
sis of environmental issues and policy choices once on a central
basis. On the other hand, collecting information at the center
about relevant conditions in Member States, making decisions, and
ensuring their effective implementation involves many difficulties.
Efforts by central institutions to extend their own size and power
can produce overcentralization.
C. Constitutional Arrangements
The final key variable in the determination of environmental
policy consists of the institutional structure, including decision
rules for determining common measures. These constitutional ar-
rangements are not, of course, fixed. They must themselves be cho-
sen, and may be modified. Choices of constitutional arrangements
will reflect an evaluation by affected interests of relative benefits
and burdens similar to that underlying their evaluation of particu-
lar environmental measures, but at a much higher level of general-
ity. What is remarkable, to the United States observer, is the
emergence in the Community of different decision rules-for ex-
ample, unanimous versus qualified majority voting in the Coun-
cil-for legislation in different fields of substantive policy. Indeed,
under the Single European Act, different decision rules apply to
the adoption of environmental measures, depending on their ra-
tionale.7 These variations introduce additional complexity and un-
predictability into the evolution of environmental policy. They also
create challenges for the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") in po-
licing adherence to the rules of the game.'
Until recently, however, Council voting on Community envi-
ronmental legislation-legislation based on Articles 100 and
235-was governed by a rule of unanimity.9 The unanimity rule
reflected the relative dominance of the Member States in Commu-
7 See Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Arts 100A, 130S.
' The leading case is the ECJ's decision on Community Directive 89/428, imposing con-
trols on titanium dioxide processing wastes. The court agreed with the Commission that the
legislation could be adopted with qualified majority voting under Article 100A, rejecting the
Council's position that it must be adopted through unanimous voting under Article 130S.
Case C-300/89, Commission v Council, 1991 ECR 1-2821. See Koen Lenaerts, Some
Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U Chi Legal F 93,
126-28.
' For a review of the legal framework for Community environmental legislation prior to
Maastricht, see Rehbinder & Stewart, Integration Through Law (cited in note 3); Auke
Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case Study in Federalism,
12 Fordham Intl L J 311 (1989); Dirk Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the
Environmental Policy of the European Community, 12 European L Rev 407 (1987); Chris-
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nity politics, strong concerns about maintenance of national sover-
eignty, and a corresponding principle of subsidiarity, belatedly en-
shrined in the Single European Act in Article 130R(4). 10 The
principle of subsidiarity holds that common measures should not
be adopted unless a Community solution would be superior to reli-
ance on decentralized measures adopted by the various Member
States. Under a decision rule of unanimity, this superiority must
presumably be established to the satisfaction of each Member
State.
Even when operating under the unanimity rule, the Commu-
nity adopted a surprisingly large corpus of environmental legisla-
tion. I use the word "surprisingly" because a rule of unanimous
agreement encourages strategic behavior and creates the risk of
deadlock. The difficulties of agreement are compounded by the in-
creasing number of Member States and the great differences
among them. Professor Rehbinder and I suggested several reasons
why the Community has, nonetheless, made so much legislative
progress.11 First, Member States often had a policy of reciprocal
forbearance of the veto power. Apparently, Member States that
would otherwise oppose a particular measure have been persuaded
to forbear their veto right, in the expectation that others will simi-
larly forbear opposing measures of special concern to them. Sec-
ond, the Member States would compromise, sometimes accepting
two alternative approaches for dealing with a given environmental
problem, in order to secure unanimous agreement. The leading ex-
ample is the adoption in the 1976 Aquatic Environment Directive
of both emission limitations and ambient quality strategies for
dealing with discharges of hazardous water pollutants. 2 Third,
there were important implementation gaps. Weaknesses in the
Community's means of ensuring effective implementation and en-
forcement of environmental legislation has made it easier for
tian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic Community: New Powers
Under the Single European Act, 14 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 249 (1991).
"1 This principle of subsidiarity was transferred to a separate, more general, article in
the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty
provides that: "In the areas which do not fall within its exclusive competences, the Commu-
nity shall take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community." 31 ILM 247, 257-58. Ludwig Krgmer, EEC Treaty and Envi-
ronmental Protection 71-75 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), contends that the subsidiarity provi-
sion is not judicially enforceable because the criterion of "better" is too indefinite.
" Rehbinder & Stewart, Integration Through Law (cited in note 3).
" See Lomas, 33 McGill L J at 515-17 (cited in note 5).
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Member States to acquiesce in measures that they would oppose if
they were required to achieve prompt and full compliance.
The Single European Act explicitly recognizes environmental
protection as a distinct Community objective, adding a new Title
XII to the Treaty entitled "Environment." The addition of an en-
vironmental title to the Treaty was an event of greater political
than legal significance. Community environmental legislation had
already been liberated from the narrower goal of harmonizing
Member State measures to promote economic integration and had
begun to pursue environmental protection for its own sake.13 But
the SEA made other constitutional changes of considerable impor-
tance. It adopted qualified majority voting in the Council for envi-
ronmental measures related to the achievement of the internal
market and enlarged the role of the Commission and the Parlia-
ment in such legislation through the so-called "co-operation proce-
dure.' 4 The Maastricht draft treaty would extend these new ar-
rangements to almost all environmental legislation.' 5
The rule of qualified majority voting, along with the enhanced
role given the Commission and the Parliament in the legislative
process through the co-operation procedure,' 6 has already acceler-
ated the output of economic legislation to achieve the program of
'3 See Rehbinder & Stewart, Integration Through Law at 15-33 (cited in note 3).
" See EEC, Arts 100A, 149.
15 Maastricht draft treaty Article 130S, as revised, would authorize qualified majority
voting for all environmental legislation except for "provisions primarily of a fiscal nature,"
"measures concerning town and country planning, land use with the exception of waste
management and measures of a general nature, and management of water resources," and
"measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources
and the general structure of its energy supply." 31 ILM at 286.
These changes should largely eliminate the current controversy between the Commis-
sion and the Council as to whether Community legislation imposing controls on industrial
processes and wastes should be based (as the Commission prefers) on Article 100A, which
provides for qualified majority voting, or (as the Council prefers) on Article 130S, which
currently requires a unanimous vote unless the Council otherwise provides. See the "Tita-
nium Dioxide" decision, Case C-300/89, Commission v Council, 1991 ECR 1-2821, in which
the ECJ sided with the Commission in holding that Article 100A authorizes adoption of
process control legislation by qualified majority. See note 8.
" Under Article 149, the Commission proposes legislation to the Council. If the Council
adopts legislation (which may differ from the Commission's proposal), it must submit such
legislation, along with the Commission's proposal, to the Parliament. If the Parliament ei-
ther approves the Council's measure or fails to act, the Council's measure becomes law. If
the Parliament rejects the Council's measure, the Council must readopt it unanimously for
it to become law. If the Parliament proposes amendments, the Commission reexamines its
original proposal in light of those proposed amendments and submits its reexamined propo-
sal to the Council. The Council may then adopt the Commission's new proposal by qualified
majority, or an alternative by unanimous consent. Article 149 establishes various deadlines
for these steps.
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completing the internal market in 1992.17 These new constitutional
arrangements, which are an important step towards transforming
the Community into a federal polity, should also make it easier to
adopt environmental legislation. Especially significant is the fact
that both the Commission and the Parliament strongly favor
stronger Community environmental initiatives. There are, however,
complicating factors, quite apart from the general reverberations
from popular opposition to Maastricht, which suggest that the
road to a stronger Community environmental policy may not be
altogether straight and easy.
The pace achieved in legislating for the internal market may
not be matched in the environmental area. All Member States
have a large common interest in the economic dividends created by
economic integration. Conflicts of interest are perhaps more evi-
dent in environmental policy. 18
Moreover, the U.S. experience suggests that, over the long run,
a complex legislative process that divides authority among differ-
ently constituted political organs increases the risk of stalemate.1 "
This process, along with the relative decline in the authority of the
Member States, will enhance the relative influence of cross-cutting
industrial or environmental interests organized on a Community-
wide basis, further dividing power among different political actors
and increasing the risk of deadlock.2"
In addition, a rule of non-unanimous decision is likely to un-
dermine norms of reciprocity among the Member States. The exis-
tence of a mutual veto gave each Member State some assurance
that intense views on a particular matter would be accorded re-
spect by others with less pressing concerns, in the expectation of
reciprocal deference on other issues. The continuing expansion of
the number of Member States will also erode norms of reciprocity.
The effects of a breakdown in reciprocity are, however, two-sided.
Member States forming a minority on an issue will feel freer to
" See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results and
Prospects, 11 Mich J Intl L 1097, 1103-04 (1990).
" See Lomas, 33 McGill L J at 532-39 (cited in note 5).
9 The new legislative procedures in the Community, however, contain deadlines and
other procedural devices to prevent deadlock and thus far have not in fact produced serious
problems of deadlock. See Ehlermann, 11 Mich J Intl L at 1107-8 (cited in note 17).
'0 Professor Rehbinder and I hypothesized that Member State governments may sup-
port Community legislation to adopt environmental measures that they would like to adopt
domestically but are reluctant to do so because of domestic opposition from industry or
development interests. See Rehbinder & Stewart, Integration Through Law (cited in note
3). To the extent that such interests effectively organize on a Community-wide basis to
influence Community policy, the efficacy of this "end run" strategy will be undercut.
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persist in opposition. Similarly, majority Member States will be
less inhibited in pressing forward despite opposition.2 1
The new legislative arrangements will, on balance, probably
make it easier to adopt stronger and more far-reaching Community
environmental legislation. Yet, such legislation would create two
problems. The first is that minority Member States who wished to
adopt stronger measures of environmental protection may find
that their ability unilaterally to adopt such measures domestically
has been preempted by Community legislation which they regard
as insufficiently protective. This problem typically arises in the
case of product regulation.
The second and more troublesome problem is that minority
Member States who oppose new environmental legislation because
they regard it as unduly stringent may simply drag their feet in
compliance. The right of veto in the Council may be replaced by a
tactic of passive nullification. Implementation gaps are likely to
become more severe. This problem typically arises in the context
of process regulation. As discussed more fully below,' 2 the Commu-
nity's existing institutional arrangements do not provide a very ef-
fective remedy for this problem. Unless ways are found to
strengthen implementation and enforcement of Community envi-
ronmental legislation, while also accommodating differences in the
concerns and conditions of the differing Member States, actual
progress in Community-wide environmental protection will be
undermined.
II. COMMUNITY REGULATION OF SPILLOVERS AND THE INTERNAL
MARKET
This part of my Article examines the issues discussed above in
the context of different types of environmental spillovers. The fun-
damental distinction is between regulation of products and regula-
tion of industrial, commercial, and agricultural processes and the
residuals that they generate.
" This does not necessarily mean that divided votes will actually occur. The high per-
centage of unanimous votes under majority voting suggests that minority states will often
acquiesce in a result that is predetermined under majority voting rules rather than publicly
register their lack of influence.
" See Part II B of this Article.
" This Article does not discuss the issue of resource preservation, which is likely to
present especially serious problems of implementation and enforcement, particularly if the
Community adopted ambitious protective measures like the U.S. Endangered Species Act,
16 USC §§ 1531-1544 (1988). Thus far, the only important Community legislation is this
area is the significant but narrow migratory bird directive, Council Dir 79/409, 1979 OJ
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A. Regulation of Products and Wastes
Different state product regulations pose an obvious and imme-
diate threat to the realization of an internal market and the associ-
ated economic integration that are basic objectives of a federal or
supranational political system. Accordingly, harmonization of such
measures must be a central objective of such systems.
The threat to the internal market stems from the strong stra-
tegic position of states importing products manufactured else-
where. A state that is downwind of an air pollution source in an-
other state cannot block the pollution. Nor can it block lax
environmental regulation in another state that gives industry in
the other state a competitive advantage in world markets. In these
situations, collective action is needed to prevent the spillover.2" In
the case of products, however, self-help is readily available. A state
may simply prohibit the import of products from other states that
it judges deficient from the viewpoint of environment, health, or
safety.25 This form of self-help, however, can and has been used for
protectionist purposes. Further, self-help threatens to create a tan-
gle of conflicting or cumulatively burdensome requirements in dif-
ferent states, preventing full realization of scale economies in man-
ufacture, distribution, and marketing. Experience dating back to
the American Articles of Confederation indicates the extreme diffi-
culty in dealing with this problem through voluntary harmoniza-
tion, at least if the number of states involved is substantial. Some
L103, but additional measures are under active consideration. This Article also does not
discuss the implementation of the environmental impact assessment directive, Council Dir
85/337, 1985 OJ L175, or deal with the growing role of international environmental protec-
tion negotiations and agreements in the development of Community environmental policy.
24 Collective action is also necessary in order to prevent destruction in another state of
highly valued environmental resources.
26 Such exclusions have typically been justified on the ground that the product itself
causes harm, such as when a state seeks to bar the import of a particular model of automo-
bile because of excessive emissions. But a state might also conceivably seek to bar a product
on the ground that the means by which it was produced was environmentally destructive.
For example, the United States, as required by congressional legislation, has barred the
importation of tuna caught by Mexican fishing boats on the ground that the rate of dolphin
kill associated with the Mexican fleet's take of tuna was significantly greater than that re-
quired of the U.S. fleet. As concern with the impact of environmental regulation on interna-
tional competitiveness increases, states may also seek to impose a tax on imported goods
manufactured in states with laxer process regulation.
The threat to free trade posed by measures aimed at environmental conditions in the
exporting state is potentially far more sweeping than that posed by measures aimed at the
characteristics of the imported product itself. A panel of the GATT has found that the U.S.
ban on imports of Mexican tuna is a violation of the GATT on precisely this ground. GATT
Panel Report, "United States-Restrictions on the Import of Tuna," D521/R (Sept 3, 1991).
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central authority must police the states' exercise of the power of
self-help.
In both the United States and the Community, this responsi-
bility has fallen to the high Court. In the United States, the Su-
preme Court invokes the negative commerce clause doctrine.2 '6 In
the Community, the ECJ utilizes Articles 30, 34, and 36, prohibit-
ing Member State measures that have the effect of restricting or
hindering trade, unless they are justified as promoting "the protec-
tion of health and life of humans, animals, or plants" and do not
represent a "means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on trade. '27 While one might read "protection of life and
health" narrowly as not including certain measures to protect envi-
ronmental resources, the ECJ has held that the permissible justifi-
cations for restrictive Member State measures include "mandatory
requirements" under Community law and that these, in turn, in-
clude environmental protection. 8
From Rewe-Zentrale-AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr
Branntwein ("Cassis de Dijon"),29 to the Danish returnable bottle
30 31case , to the Walloon wastes decision, 1 the ECJ has sought to bal-
ance the interests in a common market and economic integration
with the interests of a Member State in environmental, health, and
safety protection, through techniques quite similar to those em-
ployed by the United States Supreme Court. 2 The Danish bottle
case, which bears a striking resemblance to a U.S. decision uphold-
ing an Oregon recycling measure, 3 shows that the ECJ is prepared
to uphold Member State environmental measures despite their ad-
26 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3. See, for example, Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US 137
(1970); Dean Milk Co. v City of Madison, 340 US 349 (1951); Minnesota v Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 US 456 (1981).
27 EEC, Art 36.
28 See Francis G. Jacobs, Europe After 1992: The Legal Challenge, 1992 U Chi Legal F
1, 9-10; Case 302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v Denmark, 1988 ECR 4607,
1989:1 CMLR 619; Case 240/83, Procureur de ta Republique v Association de defense des
bruleuers d'huiles usagees, 1985 ECR 531, 549 (1985).
29 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale-AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979
ECR 649, 1979:3 CMLR 494.
20 Case 302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans, 1988 ECR 4607, 1989:1 CMLR 619.
- Case C-2/90, Commission v Belgium (July 9, 1992).
32 The common judicial techniques include a prohibition on overtly discriminatory
measures, an assessment of other trade-burdening measures by examining the proportional-
ity between the benefits secured and burdens imposed, the availability of less restrictive
alternative measures, and other evidence of discriminatory purpose. See cases cited in note
26. The Walloon Wastes decision, however, upheld a discriminatory ban on solid waste im-
ports. See text at notes 55-57.
13 American Can Co. v Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or App 618, 517 P2d 691
(1974).
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verse impact on trade and potentially protectionist motives. These
decisions can be understood as a form of partial negative harmoni-
zation of Member State law. The harmonization is negative, be-
cause it proceeds by invalidating Member State law, as opposed to
legislating uniform standards. It is partial, because Member State
regulation may be sustained if its adverse impact on trade is out-
weighed by the states' legitimate environmental interests. As the
Danish returnable bottle case indicates, this balancing test can re-
sult in some aspects of a state's product regulation being upheld
while others are invalidated. 4
The other means of dealing with the problems created by de-
centralized product regulation is through affirmative central legis-
lation.3 5 Unlike partial negative harmonization, however, legisla-
tion can be a means to promote environmental protection on a
common basis. It also has advantages in dealing with the threats to
economic integration posed by disparate Member State product
regulation. The process of case-by-case adjudication is slow and
somewhat unpredictable. For those products of greatest environ-
mental and market significance, legislation potentially provides a
swifter and surer remedy for conflicts between trade and environ-
mental policy. Both industry and environmental groups have rea-
son to favor product legislation, although they will disagree over
how stringent it should be. Such arguments, and the differing in-
terests of Member States, may result in stalemate. The great ad-
vantage of dealing with the, problem of divergent state product reg-
ulations judicially is that the court must hear and decide a
controversy properly before it. On the other hand, a court decision
which highlights a product regulation issue and resolves it in a
manner many Member States may not like can often precipitate
legislation in response.
Both the United States and the European Community have
adopted uniform standards for the most environmentally signifi-
cant categories of products, including motor vehicles, fuels, deter-
The ECJ upheld Denmark's requirement that all manufacturers of beverages ensure
recycling of beverage containers, but invalidated requirements that manufacturers use one
of 24 standardized containers. Non-Danish manufacturers had attacked these requirements
as protectionist measures imposing a disproportionate burden on imported beverages. Case
302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans, 1988 ECR 4607, 1989:1 CMLR 619.
"I Informal, voluntary harmonization through industry trade associations is another al-
ternative which has been successfully used, sometimes under the aegis of Community legis-
lation, when highly technical and relatively non-controversial specifications are involved.
However, such techniques are less successful when higher-visibility environmental issues
with significant trade implications are involved.
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gents, pesticides, and other chemical products. 6 Community prod-
uct legislation is far more systematic than process legislation
because of the mutual interest of all states in avoiding barriers to
the free flow of products throughout the internal market.37 The
principle of mutual recognition, originally developed by the ECJ in
the Cassis de Dijon case," when supplemented by Community leg-
islation that focusses on harmonization of common standards for
the most essential attributes of products and relies on private stan-
dard-setting organizations to fill in the details, has proved a useful
means of obtaining workable harmonization of Member State
product regulation without imposing either detailed, rigid, and in-
evitably obsolescent uniformity or provoking incessant litigation. 9
There is no great problem in enforcing Community product stan-
dards, because Member States can effectively prohibit the sale or
use of non-complying products within their borders.
A key question, however, is whether Member States may es-
tablish and enforce product standards more stringent than those
adopted through Community legislation. To the extent that they
can, the threat to the internal market remains. The federal courts
in the United States regularly confront this issue under the rubric
of preemption,4 asking whether Congress meant to exclude more
stringent state regulation. Sometimes statutes clearly answer the
question one way or another, but often, because of political stale-
mate among state interests and various nationally-organized inter-
est groups, statutes are silent or ambiguous. The decisions of the
se For United States legislation, see, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 USC §§ 136-13 6y; Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§ 7401-7671 (1983 &
Supp 1991); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC §§ 2601-2671 (1982 & Supp 1992).
For Community legislation, see, for example, Council Dir 91/441, 1991 OJ L242 (amend-
ing Council Dir 70/220 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
measures to be taken against air pollution by emission from motor vehicles); Council Dir 86/
94, 1986 OJ L80:51 (amending for second time Directive 73/404/EEC on the approximation
of the laws of the Member States relating to detergents).
17 Conflicts of interest among states are more pronounced in the case of process regula-
tion, where differences in regulatory standards can result in differences in competitive ad-
vantage. See Eckard Rehbinder and Richard Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Sys-
tems: European Community Environmental Law, 33 Am J Comp L 371, 393-98 (1985).
" Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale-AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979
ECR 649, 1979:3 CMLR 494.
11 See Ehlermann, 11 Mich J Intl L at 1101-02 (cited in note 17); Lenaerts, 1992 U Chi
Legal F at 110 (cited in note 8).
" See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is
Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 Ecology L Q 679 (1979); Note, Federal Preemption of
State Hazardous Waste Funds: Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 13 Ecology L Q 535 (1986). See also
litigation concerning the Toxic Substances Control Act, Warren County v North Carolina,
528 F Supp 276 (E D NC 1981); SED, Inc. v Dayton, 519 F Supp 979 (S D Ohio 1981).
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Supreme Court on this subject do not provide much illumination
for the ECJ, which must consider similar issues in a different con-
stitutional context.
Under the formerly prevailing rule of unanimity in Council
voting, an "environmental" state such as Denmark could block
preemptive Community legislation that established what it re-
garded as an unduly low level of protection and seek unilaterally to
impose a higher level of protection through national law.41 With
qualified majority voting, that veto is gone. Particularly given the
impetus to harmonization by the push to achieve the internal mar-
ket, "environmental" states run the risk of being forced to adhere
to standards, adopted by a majority, which they regard as insuffi-
ciently protective. In order to deal with this problem, the SEA
adopted a special procedure which may allow a Member State to
"opt out" of Community legislation by adopting a more stringent
standard.42
Article 100A of the Treaty authorizes legislation, approved by
a qualified majority, for the harmonization of Member State mea-
sures in order to promote the establishment or functioning of the
internal market.43 Article 100A(4) provides that if a Member State
wishes to adopt different national provisions "on grounds of major
needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the envi-
ronment or the working environment," it shall so notify the Com-
mission. "The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved
after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States."44 Further, "the Commission or any Member State may
bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers
Such unilateral regulation might, however, be challenged under Articles 30 and 34.
Thus, the extent to which the ECJ allows such states to adopt unilateral measures will
significantly affect their position on Community legislation.
The use of this example should not imply that some states are invariably "environmen-
tal" states and other states invariably not. The identity of those states that support, and
oppose, more stringent environmental measures will often shift depending on the precise
issue in question.
42 EEC, Art 100A.
"3 Under Article 130S, by contrast, voting must be unanimous, retaining the Member
State veto. This difference in procedures has generated controversy over what types of legis-
lation may be adopted under Article 100A and what types must be adopted under Article
130S. See notes 8 and 15. Article 130T, however, provides that "the protective measure
adopted in common pursuant to Article 130S shall not prevent any Member State from
maintaining or introducing more stringent measures compatible with the Treaty." EEC, Art
130T. It is unclear what principles the ECJ will develop to interpret this provision.
" EEC, Art 100A.
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that another Member State is making improper use" of its power
to adopt different national measures.45
This procedure raises two basic problems. First, does the ECJ
have the power to invalidate a more stringent Member State stan-
dard? To the American observer, the answer must surely be "yes."
More stringent state product regulation could pose a grave threat
to the internal market. Given the overriding importance attached
to the internal market in the Community scheme, the ECJ could
not appropriately uphold a state measure simply because it is pro-
claimed by the Member State to serve health, safety, and environ-
mental goals. At the very least, the ECJ must satisfy itself that the
measure in fact substantially promotes such goals and is not a dis-
guised protectionist measure. As a short and well-justified further
step, the ECJ could insist that the adverse impact on the internal
market is not unduly disproportionate to the environmental,
health, and safety interests secured by the measure.
A second problem is how the ECJ should structure its inquiry
into these issues. Should it give weight to the background and ra-
tionale for the Community legislation in question? The issue is
not, as in the United States, one of preemption. Article 104A(4)
provides that Community legislation may be denied preemptive ef-
fect even if the legislation includes an explicit preemption provi-
sion. Still, if the legislation reflects a careful consideration of envi-
ronmental concerns and a well-supported judgment that more
stringent Member State standards would pose a serious threat to
the internal market, those factors should be given weight.
Moreover, what weight should the ECJ give to the views of the
Commission? The provisions of 100A(4) could be read to imply
that the Commission's determination is conclusive. However, this
seems inconsistent with the provision giving Member States, as
well as the Commission, the right to challenge a Member State
provision before the ECJ. This interpretation is also contrary to
general principles of administrative law, which imply that the
Commission's reasoning, and perhaps any relevant factual determi-
nations, should be reviewed by the ECJ. However, the Commis-
sion's views surely merit substantial deference. This follows not
only from the structure of 100A(4), but also because the Commis-
sion can be expected to evaluate conscientiously the competing in-
terests in free trade and the internal market.
45 Id.
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An additional question is what weight the ECJ will give to the
admonition in 100A(3) that Community legislation adopted pursu-
ant to 100A which concerns "health, safety, environmental protec-
tion and consumer protection" will "take as a base a high level of
p rotection." It seems doubtful that the ECJ would directly invali-
date Community legislation for failure to adhere to such a subjec-
tive standard. But the ECJ should be readier to permit more strin-
gent state regulation if it judges the Community legislation unduly
lax.
Finally, to what extent will the ECJ, in deciding cases arising
under Article 100A(4), draw on the jurisprudence that it has devel-
oped in cases arising under Articles 30, 34, and 36, which govern in
the absence of relevant Community legislation? 4
Until the ECJ clarifies these questions, the impact of the new
procedures for environmental legislation on the amount of product
regulation in the Community will remain unclear. As already
noted, qualified majority voting deprives "environmental" states of
the right to veto Community legislation that they regard as unduly
lax. On the other hand, qualified majority voting may result in leg-
islation adopting a higherlevel of protection than would otherwise
be the case because states opposed to more stringent regulation
have also lost the veto. The enhanced role of the Commission and
Parliament in environmental legislation under the new procedures
should also favor more stringent legislation, as the history of Com-
munity legislation on automobile emissions illustrates.47 As Judge
4" A further question is how the ECJ will deal with situations where environmental
legislation is adopted under 130S rather than 100A. The Maastricht accords, if ratified, pro-
vide for qualified majority voting for most such legislation. Maastricht would also amend
130T to provide that: "The protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 130S shall not
prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective mea-
sures. Such measures must be compatible with this Treaty. They shall be notified to the
Commission." Does this provide the equivalent of the procedure provided under 10OA? Does
it simply restate the procedure already available under Articles 30, 34, and 36? Or does it
imply some new and different procedure?
' See Lomas, 33 McGill L J at 524-31 (cited at note 5); Bradford S. Gentry, Environ-
mental Regulation in Europe: Hazardous Wastes and Contaminated Sites, 10 Nw J Intl L
& Bus 397, 407-08 (1990). Community legislation imposing emission limitations on automo-
biles was originally driven by concern to prevent obstacles to economic integration posed by
differing Member State standards. In the 1980s, however, environmental concerns generated
proposals to make Community standards more stringent. These efforts were opposed by
some Member States worried about costs and international competitiveness. The Council
adopted a compromise, imposing relatively strong standards for large and medium cars and
substantially less stringent standards for small cars. The Parliament, however, increased the
stringency of these measures, and its changes were supported by the Commission. The
Council could not muster a unanimous vote to restore its original version. The alternative of
not legislating at all on the subject was politically unacceptable. The Council accordingly
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Lenaerts points out, no case under Article 100A has been brought
since its adoption. Member States who have threatened to invoke
the Article 100A procedure to adopt unilaterally more stringent
measures have succeeded in stimulating Community legislation
that is more responsive to their concerns. This practice shows that
the Member States would rather compromise their differences in a
forum that they control by adopting legislation on the issue in the
Council than surrender the issue to the vagaries of adjudication in
the ECJ. 5
A further complicating factor is the interplay between Mem-
ber State product regulation, adjudication under Articles 30, 34,
and 36, and new Community legislation. A decision, such as the
Danish returnable bottle case,"' upholding Member State product
regulation notwithstanding its adverse trade impacts, may be
thought to favor environmental protection. Such a decision may
indeed do so within the Member State adopting the measure, but
it simultaneously removes the incentive of that Member State to
support a Community directive on the matter, which the Member
State would certainly do if its regulation were judicially invali-
dated. Freedom for the environmentalist states to adopt relatively
protective regulations may result in a level of protection in the rest
of the Community that is lower than it might otherwise be. But
there is an offsetting tendency: the interest in market access by
firms in other Member States may lead them to favor Community
legislation-provided that it is preemptive of stricter state stan-
dards-even though it is more stringent than they would otherwise
favor. The balance among these considerations will in turn be af-
fected by the jurisprudence, yet to be established, under Article
100A(4).
One potential solution to these tensions is the use of alterna-
tive harmonization in Community product legislation. When the
United States adopted regulatory limitations on automobile emis-
sions in 1967, the California delegation to Congress insisted on
California's right to adopt stricter standards in order to deal with
the acute smog problem in Los Angeles and other areas of the
acquiesced in the revised, stronger legislation. Council Dir 89/458, 1989 OJ L226:1 (Euro-
pean emission standards for cars below 1.4 litres, Council Dir 70/220/EEC on the approxi-
mation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollu-
tion by emissions from motor vehicles).
" Lenaerts, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 110-12 (cited in note 8).
" Case 302/86, Re Disposable Cans of Beer: Commission v Denmark, 1988 ECR 4607,
1989:1 CMLR 619.
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state.5 Congress acquiesced, but on the condition that the federal
Environmental Protection Agency approve the California stan-
dards as necessary to meet serious air quality problems.5' Subse-
quently, Congress provided that other states with serious smog
problems could also adopt the California standard.52 A number of
Northeastern states are taking advantage of this provision. The re-
sult is a "two car" strategy, with one level of controls on cars sold
in most areas, and tighter controls on cars sold in California and
other states adopting the California standard.5 3 This dual system
of controls has apparently not impaired the achievement of scale
economies in manufacture and distribution, and it has provided a
useful "technology forcing" feature by requiring progressively
tighter controls for a limited market which, if successful, can later
be adopted nationwide. The 100A procedure, with the active lead-
ership of the Commission, could potentially develop similar strate-
gies. But the surer and more direct route would be adoption of a
"two product" approach in Community legislation. 4
Special problems are presented by interstate shipments of
hazardous waste, which can be viewed as a negative product. The
United States Supreme Court has held that waste is a proper arti-
cle of commerce and has invalidated discriminatory state legisla-
tion prohibiting disposal of waste originating from other states. 5
The recent decision by the ECJ in Commission v Belgium,56 agreed
that wastes were "goods" protected by the free trade principles of
Article 30. Nonetheless, the ECJ upheld legislation by the Wal-
lonia region of Belgium imposing a ban on wastes imported from
outside the region for disposal, insofar as it was applied to bar im-
ports of non-hazardous solid waste from the Netherlands.
60 Pub L No 90-148, 1967 USCCAN 1939, 1956-58.
'j Clean Air Act § 209, 42 USCA § 7543 (1983 & Supp 1992).
Clean Air Act § 177, 42 USCA § 7507 (1983 & Supp 1992).
13 John Laidler, Northeast States Move to Adopt Strict California Emission Rules, LA
Times A5 (May 12, 1992).
14 For example, cars with higher control levels might be required in the urban "core" of
the Community, and cars with lesser controls allowed in the less developed "fringe." The
mobility of cars and open borders may cause some problems with a two-car strategy, but
U.S. experience indicates that car registration procedures provide an adequate safeguard
against evasion of the more stringent control requirements.
51 City of Philadelphia'v New Jersey, 437 US 617 (1978). Notwithstanding this deci-
sion, strong local opposition to disposal of out-of-state wastes have led states, such as Ala-
bama, with substantial disposal capacity to find various ways to exclude out-of-state wastes.
The Supreme Court has invalidated such discriminatory measures. See Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v Hunt, 112 S Ct 2009 (1992). Advocate General Jacobs notes a similar
phenomenon in Europe. See Jacobs, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 10-11 (cited in note 28).
- Case 2/90, Commission v Belgium (July 9, 1992).
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The ECJ validated this facially discriminatory measure by
characterizing waste as a special case because of its environmental
effects, referring to a waste disposal "emergency" in Wallonia, and
invoking the principles of "self-sufficiency" and "proximity" for
waste disposal set forth in Article 130R of the Treaty. On the other
hand, the court held that the legislation was preempted insofar as
it was applied to bar inputs of toxic wastes from the Netherlands
because the law did not conform to a Community directive that
requires the exporting state to notify the receiving state of ship-
ments and relies on the latter to police compliance with Commu-
nity requirements. The ECJ's decision upholding Wallonia's ban
as applied to solid waste has caused controversy and confusion and
will likely stimulate further Community legislation on interstate
waste shipments.
The effectiveness of EC transboundary waste controls will
likely be weakened once an internal market with open frontiers is
established. 8 Open frontiers will not pose a major problem for
Member States who validly wish to ban products regarded as un-
duly polluting or hazardous. While they may not be able to turn
back product imports at the border, they will be able, as in the
United States, to ban their sale or use. But exporters of hazardous
waste, unlike sellers of goods, have no reason to hawk their wares.
Elimination of border controls will undermine the current system
of decentralized monitoring and enforcement and points to the
need for a new Community institution, such as the European Envi-
ronment Agency,59 to exercise monitoring and oversight responsi-
bilities. In its absence, the ECJ may well be disposed to uphold
supplementary Member State regulation of interstate shipments
pursuant to Article 100A(4).
B. Regulation of Industrial Processes
Now consider the problem of pollution, wastes, and other
residuals from industrial, commercial and agricultural processes
and facilities. These residuals can create pollution spillovers. Their
regulation gives rise to competitive spillovers.
s Council Dir 84/631, 1984 OJ L326:31 (on the supervision and control within the Eu-
ropean Community of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste).
51 See Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market,. "1992", the Environ-
mental Dimension (Economica Verlag, 1990); Patrick E. Thieffry and Peter E. Nahimas,
The European Community's Regulation and Control of Waste and the Adoption of Civil
Liability, 14 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 949, 962 (1991).
" Created by Council Reg 1210/90, 1990 OJ L120:1, but not yet established because of
unresolved controversy over its site.
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Process regulation presents problems for a federal or suprana-
tional political system that are fundamentally different from the
problems created by product regulation. States adversely affected
by the pollution and economic spillovers associated with processes
and their regulation cannot protect themselves through the self-
help mechanisms available in the product context. Moreover, liti-
gation is, as a practical matter, of little assistance in the case of
most pollution spillovers ° and affords no remedy for competitive
spillovers. Accordingly, states must obtain relief through Commu-
nity legislation.
There are, however, obstacles to the adoption of such legisla-
tion. Community regulation of industrial processes, unlike product
legislation, does not provide economic benefits to all by advancing
the internal market and free trade. Industry is generally opposed
to -process regulation because it increases costs and other compli-
ance burdens. Businesses in Member States that have already
adopted stringent process regulation will, however, favor Commu-
nity legislation that imposes similar requirements on their compet-
itors in other Member States. On the other hand, Member States
who value economic development over environmental protection
will oppose such legislation. Until recently, the unanimity rule that
governed Community environmental legislation gave such states a
veto power.
As already noted, the amount of legislation dealing with pollu-
tion by industrial processes that the Community has enacted de-
spite these obstacles is remarkable. However, there remain major
gaps, most notably in the areas of hazardous air and water pollu-
tion and toxic waste cleanup. 1 In addition, there have been serious
problems in implementing and enforcing such legislation.6  Process
regulations must be enforced by the states against their own indus-
tries. States that place a higher priority on industrial development
or are concerned about the relative competitive position of their
60 Even if an injured person in the receiving state can obtain jurisdiction over pollution
sources in the polluting state and enforce a judgment against them, private litigation is ill-
suited for dealing with pollution from multiple sources, especially if such pollution
originates in many different states. Most of the serious transboundary pollution problems in
Europe and the United States have this character.
61 This pattern may reflect the fact that such hazards are less likely to result in exten-
sive transboundary problems than conventional air and water pollutants. The pollution of
the Rhine by toxic releases is a notable exception to this generalization. See Jan M. van
Dunne, ed, Transboundary Pollution and Liability: The Case of the River Rhine (Lelystad:
Vermande, 1991).
" See Rolf Wdgenbaur, The European Community's Policy on Implementation of En-
vironmental Directives, 14 Fordham Intl L J 455 (1990-91).
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industry will be tempted to delay and compromise the execution of
Community environmental legislation. The absence of direct Com-
munity enforcement authority and the lack of strong sanctions for
Member State recalcitrance invite such footdragging. Ironically,
the record of Community legislation may be as extensive as it is
precisely because Member States do not expect to be held to full
and prompt compliance with the requirements adopted.
Implementation and enforcement failures can be grouped as
formal and informal. A formal default occurs when a Member
State fails to implement a Community directive through national
legislation in a timely manner. The Commission responds with an
infringement action, which in most cases eventually produces for-
mal compliance, either as a result of a decision by the ECJ or the
threat thereof.63 However, implementing legislation is only the first
step. Administrative regulations must be written, permits issued,
monitoring performed, and enforcement actions instituted to cor-
rect and deter non-compliance. Failures in these informal parts of
the process, which are especially serious in Member States that
lack a strong political commitment to environmental protection or
have weak administrative systems, are much harder to detect and
correct. Implementation failures are especially severe in the case of
hazardous wastes, which are produced by many sources and can be
easily transported. 4 In addition, the extremely decentralized sys-
tem of implementation produces wide variations in effective sub-
stantive law in different Member States. 5 Disparities in imple-
mentation and enforcement will likely become even more serious if
nations in Eastern and Central Europe were granted some form of
membership in the Community.
The Commission is increasingly concerned with implementa-
tion and enforcement problems, 6 but the legal and administrative
resources available to it for dealing with them are quite limited.
These problems will be exacerbated by the environmental pres-
sures generated by the 1992 completion of the internal market.
e Greater use of regulations in Community environmental legislation has been urged,
in order to eliminate the delays involved in the adoption of national legislation to imple-
ment directives. See Rolf Wdgenbaur, Regulating the European Environment: The EC Ex-
perience, 1992 U Chi Legal F 17, 20. However, the Council's continued reliance on directives
indicates that Member States are willing to agree on new environmental legislation only if
they have considerable flexibility in implementing and enforcing such legislation.
64 See Note, The European Community's Amended Waste Directive, 14 BC Intl &
Comp L Rev 413 (1991).
" See Note, Regulation 1210/90: Establishment of the European Environment Agency,
14 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 321, 328 (1991).
" See Wdgenbaur, 14 Fordham Intl L J 455 (cited in note 62).
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The completion of an internal market comprising an "area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured '6 7 and the development of a com-
mon currency are expected .to stimulate a higher level of economic
development, which threatens to create commensurate increases in
pollution and other forms of environmental degradation. A Com-
mission report predicts that these increases will outstrip current
Community regulatory efforts to reduce air pollution to safe levels,
and will exacerbate transboundary hazardous waste problems."
Moreover, the completion of an internal market will increase the
importance of economic spillovers. By making it easier for invest-
ment capital to search for the best business opportunities through-
out the Community, economic integration increases the temptation
of Member States to soft-pedal environmental enforcement in
hopes of attracting such investment. Development pressures are
also expected to impose serious strains on land and other natural
resources, particularly in the Community's southern tier."
The Community has sought to accommodate the interests of
its less industrially developed members in two ways.70 First, the
EC has, in one instance, adopted different levels of control for dif-
ferent Member States. The 1988 directive on large combustion
plants71 establishes ceilings on total loadings of S02, NOx, and
TSP through a differential formula that allows some of the indus-
trializing Member States to increase their existing emissions while
forcing already industrialized states to achieve significant reduc-
tions. This compromise emerged only after a long struggle. This
may be an acceptable solution for dealing with emissions of pollu-
tants that disperse and cause problems, such as acid deposition, on
" SEA, Art 13.
" See Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market, "1992", the Environ-
mental Dimension (cited in note 58).
6 Id.
70 Fewer differences in industrial development exist among states in the United States
than in the Community, but they still play an important role in the development of environ-
mental policy. For example, states in the West that are less developed and have relatively
clean air have opposed stringent national emission limitations on new sources and preven-
tion-of-significant-deterioration restrictions on increases in pollution loadings. These mea-
sures have been favored by the industrialized states in the Midwest and Northeast, who fear
a shift in development to the West. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hass-
ler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out
for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should be Done About It (Yale, 1981); B. Peter
Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 Eco-
nomic Inquiry 551 (1985).
71 Council Dir 88/609, 1988 OJ L336.
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a wide scale. 72 However, more extensive use of non-uniform regula-
tion would undermine the logic of Community legislation and pro-
voke sharp resistance from the more industrialized states and from
environmental interests.
The other technique for dealing with the situation of the in-
dustrializing Member States is financial transfers. The Community
has used its European Regional Development Fund to finance en-
vironmental protection measures in less affluent regions. 73 Maas-
tricht endorsed a greatly expanded program of Community aid to
industrializing regions and those with especially severe environ-
mental problems in order to cushion the burden of complying with
Community legislation. But the Member States are already begin-
ning to resist paying the $75 billion cost of this and other Maas-
tricht initiatives. 4 It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the
funding needed to carry out this strategy will be forthcoming.
Such measures can help ameliorate opposition to Community
legislation by the less industrialized Member States, but they will
not necessarily ensure full and prompt compliance with such legis-
lation. Other measures are needed to overcome the threat of per-
sistent implementation gaps. These are discussed below. 75
Transboundary pollution from industrial, commercial, and ag-
ricultural processes presents special problems that are likely to be-
come more apparent as Community environmental regulation ma-
tures.7e The Community, like the United States, has sought to deal
with transboundary spillovers by the adoption of common mea-
sures to reduce pollution from all Member States. The U.S. experi-
ence suggests, however, that this will not be a wholly adequate
long-run strategy. As controls become more stringent and more ex-
72 Compare the allocation of pollution entitlement among different states under Phases
I and II of the Sulfur Trading provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. See Clean
Air Act § 404, 42 USCA § 7651(c), Table A (Supp 1992). As developed in Part III B of this
Article, a system of tradeable emission rights would be a superior means of dealing with
disparities- in regional development.
73 See Wiigenbaur, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 31-32 (cited in note 63).
71 See William Drozdiak, EC Staggering Under Weight of Unity Bill, Washington Post
A31 (Feb 17, 1992).
78 See Part III of this Article.
76 For general discussion of transboundary pollution issues in the Community context,
see Note, The Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community to Control
Transnational Pollution-Time to Make Critical Choices, 12 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J
579 (1990). The magnitude of transboundary pollution problems in the Community is illus-
trated by the fact that in eight out of the twelve Member States, pollution originating
outside the Member State accounts for between one-third and three-fourths of acid deposi-
tion within the state. See Note, EC Regulation of Sulfur Dioxide Levels: Directive 89/427,
14 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 369, 375 n 54, chart A (1991).
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pensive, downwind or downstream states will seek to shift more of
the costs of control to upwind or upstream states. When the receiv-
ing state has already imposed extensive controls pursuant to com-
mon legislation and problems persist because of pollution from the
originating state, there is a strong claim that the originating state
should bear the burden of the additional controls needed to solve
the problem.7 In the United States, the courts have sought to shift
responsibility for dealing with such problems to the federal Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency,78 declaring themselves institution-
ally unfit to resolve complicated interstate disputes grounded in
federal regulatory law. The Community at present has no similar
institutional means for resolving such disputes, which are likely to
become increasingly prominent.7 9
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING COM-
MUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The most obvious solution to the weaknesses in current Com-
munity environmental policy is to strengthen the Community's
ability to ensure effective implementation and enforcement of its
legislation. The Commission is increasingly concerned about the
implementation gap problem and is exploring ways to cure it.8 0 El-
ements of such a solution would include legislation in the form of
very specific directives or regulations so as to reduce Member State
discretion; creation of a specialized Community environmental reg-
ulatory agency; and adoption of direct Community enforcement
authority against polluters and stronger sanctions for non-comply-
ing Member States.
This is a recipe familiar to Americans, for Congress has made
extensive use of these techniques in an effort to ensure that federal
environmental legislation is effectively carried out." If the Com-
munity moves forward to fuller integration, the gradual develop-
ment of stronger Community implementation and enforcement ca-
pacities is both likely and desirable. But consideration of the
" See the dispute between Arkansas (the upstream State) and Oklahoma (the down-
stream State) in Oklahoma v EPA, 112 S Ct 1046 (1992).
" See id; City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451. US 304, 328 (1981).
19 There are two basic mechanisms for resolving such disputes. One would be for the
ECJ or the Court of First Instance to rely heavily on the views of the Commission to ensure
consistency with Community policies. The other would be to enact Community legislation
providing for Commission resolution of disputes, subject to judicial review in the Commu-
nity courts.
1o See Wagenbaur, 14 Fordham Intl L J 455 (cited in note 62).
", See Stewart, 86 Yale L J 1196 (cited in note 3).
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United States experience and the present state of the Community
counsel against undue reliance on centralized "top down" com-
mand and control techniques.
The near-term prospects for any significant expansion of Com-
munity implementation and enforcement powers are dim, particu-
larly in light of public resistance to the Maastricht Treaty. Even if
it is ratified, supporters of European integration will be cautious,
extolling the importance of the subsidiarity principle. The Maas-
tricht Treaty empowers the Commission to seek fines from Mem-
ber States who fail to comply with judgments of the ECJ.s2 This
provision could be used to deal with the problem of Member State
failure to implement Community environmental legislation. How-
ever, it remains to be seen how often the Commission will be will-
ing to seek such fines and how large they will be. Moreover, such
sanctions, like the infringement actions upon which they would be
based, will, for both practical and political reasons, be directed at
only the most obvious and uncontestable forms of non-implemen-
tation, such as the failure to enact timely national legislation to
carry out a Community directive. As already explained, however,
such formal failures are only the tip of the implementation gap
problem, a problem which is deeply rooted in administrative weak-
nesses and in public and official attitudes in many Member States.
Fines are hardly an apt way of dealing with these systemic
deficiencies.
One possible response to the implementation gap problem is
the development of Community authority to enforce Community
requirements directly against polluters. The European Environ-
mental Agency was authorized with deliberately modest pow-
ers-to coordinate monitoring of environmental conditions in the
Community and assist the Commission in formulating policy pro-
posals-in order to allay fears that it would grow into an enforce-
ment inspectorate or "green police." 3 The Agency has not yet
been actually established because of persistent and embarrassing
Member State conflict over its location. Moreover, industrial and
development interests will strongly oppose any proposals to give
the Agency additional powers, such as the power to monitor and
82 Treaty on European Union, Art 171, 31 ILM 247, 292.
13 Council Reg 1210/90, 1990 OJ L120:1. For a general discussion of the proposed
Agency, see Dietrich Gorny, The European Environment Agency and the Freedom of Envi-
ronmental Information Directive: Potential Cornerstones of EC Environmental Law, 14 BC
Intl & Comp L Rev 279 (1991); Note, Environmental Policy in the European Community:
Observations on the European Environment Agency, 15 Harv Envir L Rev 257 (1991).
68 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
enforce compliance with Community environmental regulation,
that could help close implementation gaps. They would much pre-
fer to continue to deal with the Member State authorities with
whom they have long-established working relatiohships. Member
State authorities are likely to share this opposition, fearing erosion
of their own power.
Moreover, for reasons already discussed, strengthening Com-
munity implementation and enforcement capacities would not nec-
essarily ensure a commensurate strengthening of environmental
protection in the Community. Member States who may be willing
to acquiesce in new Community legislation with possible imple-
mentation and enforcement gaps may oppose such legislation if
they know that it will be executed.
Also, experience in the United States indicates that there are
serious drawbacks to excessive use of centralized direction. The ef-
fort to frame highly detailed directives at the center to govern ac-
tivities throughout a vast and varied region creates serious infor-
mation-processing and decisionmaking overload. Such directives
are likely to yield rigid, uniform, costly requirements that are not
appropriate for many of their applications and to provoke resent-
ment. Moreover, these regulations emerge from a remote political-
bureaucratic process that enjoys scant political and popular legiti-
macy. 4 The job of implementing and enforcing environmentally
protective measures cannot be done entirely or even primarily by
central authorities. The American experience shows that the center
will inevitably lack the resources, information, and responsiveness
to deal with the vast and varied problems of promoting compliance
by hundreds of thousands of different facilities and operations
throughout a huge area."5 Substantial decentralization of this effort
to state, regional, and local authorities is not only desirable but
inevitable.
Europe is, of course, a long way from experiencing the acute
dysfunctions that plague the environmental regulatory system in
the United States. Gradual steps should be taken to strengthen
Community implementation and enforcement capacities. However,
the political obstacles to such steps and the inherent limitations of
a dirigisme strategy suggest consideration of other techniques to
promote the efficacy of Community environmental policy while
embracing the subsidiarity principle. The United States experience
84 For a discussion of these phenomena in the American context,, see Richard B. Stew-
art, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U Chi L Rev 335 (1990).
88 See Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1199-1202 (cited in note 3).
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suggests two candidates: authorization of citizen suit litigation to
police compliance by Member States and regulated firms with
Community legislation, and increased use of economic incentives,
particularly transferrable pollution rights.
A. New Remedies For Environmental Plaintiffs
At the present time in the Community, standing and other le-
gal principles governing access to judicial review of governmental
decisions are governed by the law of the Member States. In many
Member States, access is unduly restricted.86 As a result, environ-
mental plaintiffs may be unable effectively to challenge failures by
Member States to implement Community legislation. The fact that
standing is more liberally granted in some Member States than
others may also contribute to uneven implementation and enforce-
ment of Community directives. 87 Moreover, environmental plain-
tiffs generally lack the power to enforce requirements established
pursuant to Community legislation directly against regulated
entities.
During the past 25 years, there has been remarkable growth in
the U.S. in the legal remedies available to beneficiaries of environ-
mental and other regulatory programs who wish-to correct inade-
quate implementation and enforcement of those programs. Courts
and legislators have created two basic types of remedies for such
beneficiaries.88
. The first remedies are rights of initiation and review that em-
power individuals or environmental groups to secure judicial reme-
dies against government regulatory agencies who fail to implement
environmental protection programs adequately. The normal rem-
edy is an order or judgment requiring the agency to carry out the
law. The major federal environmental regulatory statutes contain
"citizen suit" provisions authorizing "action forcing" litigation by
environmental plaintiffs against the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency for failure to honor statutory require-
ments mandating regulatory initiatives 9 In addition, general
administrative law, much of it judge-made, also enables environ-
mental plaintiffs to obtain court review of administrative decisions
"6 See Rehbinder & Stewart, Integration Through Law at 149-64 (cited in note 3).
" See Lenaerts, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 125 (cited in note 8).
88 See Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 Harv L Rev. 1193, 1202-20 (1982).
"' See, for example, Clean Air Act § 304(a)(2), 42 USCA § 7604(a)(2) (1983 & Supp
1992).
411
70 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
(including, in most cases, refusals to take action) that fall short of
statutory requirements. Traditionally, review rights were limited to
regulated firms. During the last 25 years, however, the judges ex-
tended review rights to include regulatory beneficiaries in order to
ensure that their collective interests are adequately vindicated in
the administrative process."
The second basic type of remedy for regulatory beneficiaries,
also found in the "citizen suit" provisions of the major federal en-
vironmental regulatory statutes, is a private right of action against
polluters. 1 These provisions empower environmental plaintiffs to
bring enforcement actions directly against pollution sources that
are in violation of applicable regulations and permit conditions.
The plaintiffs can obtain injunctive relief, civil penalties (payable
to the government), and their litigation expenses.
These private remedies have proved an invaluable supplement
or prod to federal and state implementation and enforcement of
federal environmental laws. Government enforcement resources are
limited. States are often reluctant to implement fully federal re-
quirements that will impose costs and other burdens on local in-
dustry and commerce. The availability of private remedies, and the
impetus which they have given to environmental group initiative,
have gone far to close the implementation and enforcement gaps
that would otherwise occur. This experience points to the desira-
bility of developing a new Community law of remedies regarding
access to judicial review and private enforcement.
Private rights of initiation and review might be created by the
ECJ, following two principles established by the federal courts in
the United States. The first principle holds that where federal sub-
stantive rights are at issue in state court proceedings, state courts
may not adhere to state procedural or remedial rules that fail to
effectively secure such rights, but must instead follow federal pro-
cedures and remedial rules.92 This principle has not, however, been
extensively applied because the federal courts are generally availa-
ble to vindicate federal substantive rights, and plaintiffs almost al-
ways prefer the federal forum. At present, the Community lacks
the equivalent of the federal district courts. Accordingly, in Eu-
rope, the parallel question of whether Community law should gov-
ern remedies in Member State courts to vindicate rights estab-
lished by Community legislation is far more important.
90 See Stewart & Sunstein, 95 Harv L Rev at 1202-20 (cited in note 88).
o' See, for example, Clean Water Act § 505, 33 USCA § 1365 (1986 & Supp 1992).
92 Testa v Katt, 330 US 386 (1946).
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The second principle has already been mentioned: that envi-
ronmental plaintiffs have standing to secure judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions that have an adverse impact on such plain-
tiffs." This principle relates to standing before federal courts to
challenge federal administrative decisions but could logically be
extended to standing in state court to challenge state administra-
tive decisions based on federal law.
9 4
By combining these two principles, the ECJ could establish
that Community law governs the issue of standing to secure judi-
cial review by a Member State court of administrative failure to
adopt and implement Community legislation and that standing
should be liberally granted to environmental plaintiffs. This step,
which would be based upon the developing ECJ requirement that
Member State procedural rules ensure the effectiveness of Com-
munity law,95 would enable environmental plaintiffs to challenge
non-implementation of Community legislation.
As noted by Judge Lenaerts and Advocate General Jacobs,
there are indications that the ECJ may be prepared to take such a
step. In its October 1991 decision in Commission v Germany,9 the
ECJ found, at the insistence of the Commission, that Germany had
failed adequately to implement Community legislation regarding
the quality of surface waters used for drinking water supplies. The
ECJ remarked in pointed dicta that where a Member State had
failed to carry out clear duties mandated by Community legislation
for the protection of health, those whose health was adversely af-
fected were entitled to a remedy for the violation of their rights.9 7
However, the opinion does not make clear the precise nature of the
remedy.
91 The fact that the harm is diffuse and shared by many others does not defeat stand-
ing. For example, a single resident of Los Angeles would have standing to complain that
regional air pollution control plans approved by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency were inadequate and therefore violated federal statutory requirements, even though
the impact on air quality was marginal and was shared by millions of others. See Sierra
Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972).
91 This extension has not in fact occurred because an adequate remedy in federal court
is available in most cases. The Supreme Court has, however, held that the federal constitu-
tional requirement of due process protects the interest of a beneficiary of a state regulatory
program against arbitrary deprivation of protection. Logan v Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
US 422 (1982).
See Lenaerts, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 99-100 (cited in note 8).
Case C-58/89, Commission v Germany (October 17, 1991).
17 Id at 14.
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The ECJ took a far more decisive step in Francovitch v It-
aly,98 holding that a Member State that caused injury to one of its
citizens as a result of its failure to implement Community legisla-
tion must allow the injured person to maintain an action against
the Member State for the resulting damages. The plaintiff was a
former employee of a now-insolvent company that had failed to
pay him his wages. The Italian Government had failed to imple-
ment a Community directive requiring that Member States estab-
lish a system of insurance funds to make good such defaults.
This decision would be revolutionary in the American context,
and has apparently caused surprise in Europe as well. The United
States has long recognized the principle of state sovereign immu-
nity, enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.
Federal courts have never thought that this principle precluded in-
junctive or declaratory relief against actions by state officials that
violate federal law. They have, however, been unwilling to impose
damage liability against state governments unless explicitly au-
thorized by Congress. This distinction between injunctive relief
and damage liability is based in part on the legislative background
of the Eleventh Amendment, in part on the tradition of common
law remedies against government officers, and in part on the view
that imposition of money damages is a far more serious invasion of
state sovereignty than an injunction requiring state officials to
comply with federal law.99
The present situation in the Community is precisely the re-
verse. The ECJ has, without the benefit of Community legislation,
recognized an action for damages against Member States by a ben-
eficiary of Community legislation, but has not yet explicitly recog-
nized the right of such a person to seek specific relief. This may in
part represent a judgment, certainly defensible, that a money judg-
ment intrudes less on state sovereignty than mandatory relief. Or,
as the dictum in Commission v Germany suggests, 100 it may be
that the ECJ is simply waiting for an appropriate case in which to
establish that specific relief is also available.
The threat of Francovitch liability, however, is unlikely to
spur prompter and stronger Member State implementation and
98 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovitch v Italy (November 20, 1991). See European
Information Service, Community Law: 93% of EEC Directives Incorporated Into National
Legislation, European Report (April 4, 1992) (LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File).
" Compare Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974) (refusing to award monetary relief
against state), with Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908) (awarding injunctive relief against
state official).
00 Case C-58/89, Commission v Germany at T 14.
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enforcement of Community environmental legislation. One of the
principal reasons that such legislation is necessary is the weakness
of private law litigation in redressing and deterring harms caused
by pollution and other forms of environmental degradation. That
weakness is attributable to the factual difficulty in showing that
the diffuse risks created by pollution have caused specific harm to
specific individuals that can be quantified in money damages. This
difficulty will make it rare that a plaintiff can show that a Member
State's failure to implement and enforce Community legislation
caused him compensable harm.'0 ' Further, this difficulty is com-
pounded by the problems in determining what steps beyond the
adoption of national legislation would constitute sufficient imple-
mentation and enforcement of Community legislation to avoid
liability.
The alternative remedy would be the creation, pursuant to
Community law, of rights of private plaintiffs to enforce Commu-
nity legislation directly against polluters. Such remedies might be
recognized by the ECJ on the model of federal court decisions in
the United States "implying" private rights of action under federal
regulatory statutes.'10 As Professor Rasmussen points out, how-
ever, the ECJ has consistently refused to find that Community di-
rectives have "horizontal" legal effects creating rights and duties
among private persons. Rather, the ECJ has limited the directives'
effect to the "vertical" legal relations between Member States and
their citizens. 03 Such jurisprudence is a telling indication that the
Community is not yet a federal system like the United States, in
which the authority of the federal government vis-a-vis citizens of
the states was established from the beginning.
Community legislation could create private remedies. The
draft hazardous waste liability directive sets a potential precedent
in this respect by authorizing private plaintiffs to bring damage
,01 By contrast, in Francovitch there was a clear causal link between Italy's failure to
implement a Community directive (requiring creation of an independent insurance fund for
employees to cover an employer's insolvency) and the plaintiffs injuries (employee failed to
recover wages from an insolvent employer).
102 See Stewart & Sunstein, 95 Harv L Rev at 1206 (cited in note 88).
100 See Hjalte Rasmussen, Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Commu-
nity Law, 1992 U Chi Legal F 135, 143-46. Professor Rasmussen suggests, however, that the
decision in Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Commercial Internacional De Alimenta-
cion, 1990 ECR 4156, 1990:1 CMLR 305, portends possible change. But, the factual situa-
tion in Marleasing suggests that the case is far from recognizing affirmative rights to enforce
Community legislation through liability sanctions for non-compliance by private parties.
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actions against other private parties who violate the directive. 10 4
The directive, however, has not yet been adopted, in part precisely
because of opposition to this remedial innovation. But some of this
opposition reflects the view that private law should remain the pre-
serve of the Member States. The private enforcement remedies
proposed here would be an offshoot of public law. They could, as in
the United States, be limited to specific relief. Even with this limi-
tation, it might be feared that such remedies would unduly inter-
fere with appropriate administrative discretion in implementation
and enforcement and would force the courts to decide issues that
ought first be resolved in the -administrative process. 1 5 This prob-
lem can, however, be addressed by requiring private enforcers to
give notice to public enforcement authorities and allowing those
authorities to assume control of the enforcement action if they
wish. This is the technique used in the citizen suit provisions in
American environmental regulatory statutes.'
The recommendation of new private remedies to deal with
Member State implementation and enforcement failures may seem
inconsistent with the caution against excessive legalization
sounded earlier. But the problems of excessive legalization in the
United States have been most pronounced at the federal level,
with the development of elaborate rulemaking procedures, pro-
tracted judicial review proceedings, and "action forcing" litigation
against the Environmental Protection Agency. 10 7 It may well be
unwise to transplant this elaborate legal apparatus to Brussels. On
the other hand, excessive legalization has proved less severe at the
state level in the United States. This experience, plus the impor-
tance of the supremacy principle in Community as well as federal
law, could justify creating citizen remedies for Member States' fail-
ure to implement and enforce Community legislation, while refus-
'o' 1989 OJ C251:3 (Proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damages
caused by waste). It was further amended by 1991 OJ C192:6. See George C. Freeman and
Kyle E. McSlarrow, The Proposed European Community Directive on Civil Liability for
Waste--The Implications for U.S. Superfund Reauthorization in 1991, 46 Bus Law 1, 16-20
(1990); Thieffry & Nahimas, 14 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev at 965 (cited in note 58).
'0o This concern may underlie the Supreme Court's current reluctance to imply private
rights of action under federal regulatory statutes.
100 See, for example, Clean Air Act § 304, 42 USCA § 7604 (1983 & Supp 1992).
107 See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, 656 F2d 768 (DC
Cir 1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Train, 411 F Supp 864 (S D NY
1976); Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v EPA, 643 F2d 183 (4th Cir 1981).
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ing to authorize similar remedies against the legislative organs of
the Community.o8
There is a need in many Member States to develop stronger
and more effective environmental constituencies. The Freedom of
Environmental Information directive should encourage this devel-
opment by increasing the transparency of administrative decision-
making.109 Giving environmental groups standing to challenge offi-
cial shortcomings or to directly enforce the law against polluters
would provide an important additional stimulus. In the United
States, the creation of citizen suit enforcement actions and ex-
panded access to judicial review catalyzed the growth of environ-
mental groups, who used these new remedies to advance environ-
mental goals. Once formed, however, these groups did not limit
themselves to litigation, but expanded into administrative, politi-
cal, and public education activities. While social circumstances are
different in Europe, the creation of new legal remedies should like-
wise help to encourage the growth of organized environmental con-
stituencies at the Member State level. Such a development would
go far to promote effective implementation and enforcement of
Community legislation.
B. Economic Incentives
The use of economic incentives for environmental protection
in lieu of command and control regulation is attracting growing in-
terest in the United States and the Community. Some Member
States have used effluent charges and pollution taxes, although the
prime objective has generally been to raise revenues rather than
create incentives for pollution reduction. A panel of experts con-
vened by the Commission has recommended use of economic in-
centives in Community environmental legislation,110 as has the Eu-
ropean Parliament Committee on Environment, Public Health,
and Consumer Protection.' The Council is negotiating over a tax
108 For discussion of the ECJ's refusal to recognize such remedies, see Rasmussen, 1992
U Chi Legal F at 150-52 (cited in note 103).
'" Council Dir 90/313, 1990 OJ L158:56. For discussion, see Gorny, 14 BC Intl & Comp
L Rev 279 (cited in note 83).
"' Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use of
Economic and Fiscal Instruments in European Community Environmental Policy (1990)
(unpublished).
"' See Committee's Report on Economic and Fiscal Instruments of Environmental
Policy, Eur Parl Sess Doc A3-01301/91 (May 13, 1991).
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on carbon in fossil fuels to reduce emissions of C0 2.112 The UnitedStates has used tradeable pollution reduction credits to phase out
lead in gasoline and provide flexibility in air pollution control regu-
lation. 1" 3 The EPA is implementing an ambitious new trading pro-
gram to halve SO 2 emissions in the United States, and Southern
California is likely to adopt a broad trading scheme for smog
sources.
114
The American experience confirms the economic advantages of
market-based schemes over command and control systems: greater
flexibility, substantially lower compliance costs, and positive incen-
tives for the development of environmentally superior technolo-
gies.115 Over the long run, market-based systems should also
greatly ease the information overload at the center and the exces-
sive legalism associated with a regulatory system of central plan-
ning. Under trading, for example, the basic functions of the gov-
ernment are two: to determine the total quantity of pollution
allowed and to monitor sources to ensure that their emissions do
not exceed the amount authorized by the permits that they hold." 6
In contrast to a command and control regulatory system, economic
incentive programs do not require the government to determine,
on the basis of detailed, complex, and changing technological and
economic data, the emissions allowed each of tens of thousands of
industrial and commercial facilities throughout a vast area. In ad-
dition, economic incentives would encourage source reduction,
shifts in economic activity among sectors, and structural changes;
the Commission Task Force on the Environment and the Internal
Market found that such changes would be needed to achieve envi-
ronmental quality goals in the face of the pressures unleashed by
the internal market and that traditional regulatory controls would
not be able to achieve such changes." 7
Ill For the latest developments on the tax on carbon dioxide, see Proposal for a Coun-
cil Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 25:5 Bull EEC
46-47 (1992)..
"' See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic In-
centives, 13 Colum J Envir L 153, 161 (1988); Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum J
Envir L 171, 186 (1988).
"1 See Maura Dolan, Smog in Much of the Basin Down 50%, Study Says, LA Times
Al (July 21, 1992).
Stewart, 13 Colum J Envir L at 159-60 (cited in note 113).
110 Citizen enforcement actions could be authorized to supplement government enforce-
ment efforts.
11" Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market, "1992," the Environmen-
tal Dimension at 208-10 (cited in note 58).
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Most relevant here, however, are the political and administra-
tive advantages of economic incentives that facilitate adoption of
progressive environmental policies in the context of a federal or
supranational polity. One method by which the EC could reap
these advantages is through trading schemes, which are most at-
tractive in the case of widespread pollutants such as SO 2 , NO x ,
C0 2 , and hydrocarbons.
First, the use of trading in Community environmental legisla-
tion would make appropriate use of the scale economies and wider
comparative advantage afforded by the internal market. A Com-
munity-wide trading program would lower the costs to each Mem-
ber State of achieving a given level of environmental quality, com-
pared to the costs of achieving that level independently. This
advantage, which is not achieved by Community command and
control legislation, should encourage the adoption of progressive
measures at the Community level by reducing their cost.
Second, a trading system could be designed to accommodate
Member State autonomy by allowing such states a free hand in the
initial domestic allocation of their permit allowances.
Third, a trading system eases the Community's "legitimacy
deficit." Command and control regulation aggravates that deficit
by requiring that Brussels "Eurocrats" issue and seek to enforce
through the Member States a uniform central plan for environ-
mental protection. Trading addresses this deficit by making the
basic policy choice-the overall amount of pollution al-
lowed-more transparent and by eliminating the need for detailed
central commands.118
Fourth, trading furnishes an effective and politically palatable
way of transferring capital and pollution-reducing technologies
from the more industrialized to the less industrialized regions of
the Community. The latter can be given relatively more allowances
in recognition of their need for industrial development. Firms in
the industrialized regions facing relatively high costs for reducing
pollution could invest in pollution reductions in the industrializing
regions, where costs would likely be lower. These investments
would include the use of sophisticated, environmentally superior
technologies in new plants. Private investment, driven by competi-
tive market forces, would encourage technological innovation and
probably prove more effective and less costly than expenditures by
18 See Ackerman & Stewart, 13 Colum J Envir L at 188-91 (cited in note 113).
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public authorities for the same purpose.119 This feature of a trade-
able permit system provides another illustration of how trading
harnesses the economic advantages of the internal market to envi-
ronmental protection goals in order to create an "ecological market
economy."
While pollution fees or taxes share all of the economic advan-
tages of trading, they share only some of the political and adminis-
trative advantages. For example, they do not permit Member State
flexibility in the allocation of pollution allowances, and do not har-
ness market forces to transfer capital and technology to the indus-
trializing regions in order to promote development that is environ-
ment-friendly. 120 There is also a tension between the revenue and
incentive aspects of a pollution tax or fee. In order to have a signif-
icant incentive effect, the tax must in most cases be relatively high,
generating large revenues. Receipts from pollution taxes could be
incorporated into the fiscal base, presumably on a revenue-neutral
basis. The notion of shifting part of the tax burden from labor and
capital to pollution is attractive. Finance ministers, however, want
a dependable fiscal base. The very purpose of a pollution tax, how-
ever, is to erode the fiscal base by reducing pollution. Moreover,
polluting industries are likely to oppose a pollution tax strenu-
ously. Their opposition to a trading system is likely to be less in-
tense because they would probably not have to pay for their per-
mits,1 2 ' and they may be able to make a profit by reducing their
pollution and selling their excess permits. These considerations
suggest that greater attention should be given to the use of trading
approaches in Community legislation, although taxes and fees un-
doubtedly have'a useful role to play in many contexts.
There are other economic incentive systems which not only
harmonize economic and environmental goals but also facilitate
the adoption of progressive environmental measures at the Com-
munity level. For example, a Community system which imposed a
fee on the generation of hazardous wastes and refunded that fee
"9 The United States has proposed a scheme of international trading in greenhouse gas
reduction credits in order to channel capital and appropriate environment-friendly technol-
ogy from the developed countries to the less developed countries. This scheme would limit
the greenhouse gas emissions associated with their economic development.
120 Part of the proceeds of a pollution fee or tax could be earmarked for investment in
environmental protection in the industrializing regions, but investment decisions would be
made by public authorities.
1.. Under a trading system the government could auction off permits, but in practice




(at least in part) upon a demonstration that the wastes had been
properly treated and disposed of would ameliorate the problem of
transboundary waste shipments by making improper disposal un-
profitable and providing the private sector with incentives to accu-
rately track such wastes. The recently developed Community pro-
gram of eco-labelling 22  would harness consumer demand
throughout the internal market for environment-friendly products.
While there may be difficulties in implementing a Community eco-
labelling program, they are likely to be less than the difficulties in
agreeing on Community product standards. Even if some of these
economic incentive programs are not adopted at the Community
level, Community environmental legislation should not preclude or
discourage their use by Member States interested in experimenting
with new policy instruments. In particular, care must be taken in
Community efforts to harmonize taxes to allow Member States
flexibility to experiment with environmental fees or charges.1"'
The Community could not rely solely on economic incentives
to achieve environmental protection goals. Traditional regulatory
approaches have an important role to play, for example, in control-
ling locally harmful toxic emissions. The environmental regulatory
program of the future should follow a mixed strategy, employing
different types of instruments, each in the context in which they
are most appropriate. Still, economic incentives should play a large
role in such a program in order to nurture complementary eco-
nomic and ecological goals.
CONCLUSION
The Community has made substantial progress in developing
a common program for environmental protection, and prospects
for the future are encouraging. But the experience of the United
States suggests hazards in relying exclusively on a central planning
approach that attempts to direct environmental protection mea-
sures in the Member States through a Brussels blueprint. While
the Community needs to strengthen its implementation and en-
forcement capacities, a "top-down" approach is likely to be self-
defeating if pressed too far. In order to maintain healthy and bal-
anced progress, direction from the center needs to be comple-
122 See Wigenbaur, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 30 (cited in note 62).
12I See Eberhard Grabitz and Christian Zacker, Scope for Action by the EC Member
States for the Improvement of Environmental Protection Under EEC Law: The Example
of Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, 26 Common Mkt L Rev 423 (1989).
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mented by approaches, such as those advocated here, that en-
courage decentralized initiative and innovation.
